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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
ROY BENJAMIN HOSKINS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CaseNo.20031008-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to § 78-2a-3(e) Utah Code Ann. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to admit evidence that a 
prosecution witness committed a crime involving dishonesty or a false 
statement to impeach that witness under Utah Rules of Evidence 609? 
Although the admission or exclusion of evidence is a question of law, 
this Court should review the trial court's decision to exclude specific 
evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cruz-Meza, 76 P.3d 1165 (Utah 
2003) (citing Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 977 P.2d 474 (Utah 
1999). However, in cases involving Rule 609(a)(2), a trial court's discretion 
is severely limited. State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 529, 531 (Utah App. 1989). 
This question was preserved in the trial court through Hoskins' Third 
Motion in Limine. (R. 38-39.) 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND 
RULES AT ISSUE 
Constitution of the United States 
Amendment VI. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ... and to 
have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Constitution of Utah 
Article I, § 12. In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel ... to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him ... and the right to appeal in 
all cases. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
609(a). General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted 
of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the 
law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an 
accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the 
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
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(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of Case 
This is an appeal of a Defendant-Appellant Roy Benjamin Hoskins9 
("Hoskins") conviction of the crime of Assault, a Class B Misdemeanor, 
pursuant to § 76-5-102. Hoskins claims that the trial court erred in excluding 
specific evidence of a prosecution witness's prior convictions of crimes 
involving dishonesty or false statement. 
Course of Proceedings 
The action below was filed in the Third District Court before Hon. 
William W. Barrett. Hoskins was charged with assault, a Class A 
Misdemeanor. Hoskins filed a Third Motion in Limine to admit specific 
evidence of the alleged victim's previous convictions. Prior to trial, an 
evidentiary hearing was held, and the trial court agreed to admit evidence of 
the alleged victim's convictions for misdemeanor and felony joyriding, but 
excluded evidence of the alleged victim's convictions for felony burglary. 
After the trial in which both the alleged victim and Hoskins testified, a jury 
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found Hoskins guilty of assault, a Class B Misdemeanor. This appeal 
followed. 
Statement of Facts 
Defendant-Appellant Roy Benjamin Hoskins ("Hoskins") was 
charged with one count of assault, a class A misdemeanor, in connection 
with Hoskins' alleged altercation with Lee Wanlass on or about July 5, 
2001. (R. 1.) Prior to trial, Hoskins moved to: 1) exclude evidence of a 
confrontation involving Hoskins and others that occurred two days before 
the incident at issue (R. 34-35.), 2) admit evidence of Mr. Wanlass's 
treatment for drug addiction on or about the date of the alleged assault (R. 
36-37.), and 3) admit evidence of Mr. Wanlass's prior crimes involving 
dishonesty (R. 38-40.). 
The trial court granted Hoskins' motion to exclude evidence of the 
earlier confrontation, Tr. 164, p. 2, and denied Hoskins' motion to admit 
evidence of Mr. Wanlass's treatment for drug addiction, but did allow 
evidence of Mr. Wanlass's drug addiction, Tr. 164, p. 4. (The trial court 
designated the transcript of the trial itself as Docket No. 149 and the 
transcript of the hearing on Hoskins' Motions in Limine as Docket No. 164. 
Therefore, references to the trial transcript will refer to Tr. 149, p._; and 
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references to the hearing transcript will refer to Tr. 164, p._.) 
The trial court denied Hoskins' motion to admit evidence of Mr. 
Wanlass's conviction for joyriding, a Class A misdemeanor, Tr. 164, p. 5, 
granted Hoskins' motion to admit evidence of Mr. Wanlass's conviction for 
joyriding, a Third Degree Felony, Tr. 164, p. 24, and denied Hoskins9 
motion to admit evidence of Mr. Wanlass's four convictions for burglary, 
each a Third Degree Felony, Tr. 164, p. 24. 
At trial, the City called Mr. Wanlass as its first witness. Tr. 149, p. 1. 
Mr. Wanlass testified that Mr. Hoskins hit him. IdL at 6-7. On cross-
examination, Mr. Wanlass admitted that he was in custody for a probation 
violation related to his possession of a stolen vehicle, Li at 21, and admitted 
to his previous felony joyriding conviction, IcL at 22. 
The City's next witness, Angela Montoya, testified on direct that she 
"saw a large African American man push a Caucasian man into a car," LI at 
27, but on cross-examination expressed her opinion that Mr. Hoskins is not 
"large" and could not identify Mr. Hoskins as the assailant of Mr. Wanlass, 
Id at 30. 
The City's next witness, Jesse L. Garcia, testified that a man other 
than Mr. Hoskins hit Mr. Wanlass before Mr. Hoskins struck Mr. Wanlass. 
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Id at 37. The City then rested. IcL at 45. 
Mr. Hoskins then took the witness stand in his own defense and 
testified that Mr. Wanlass and he had been in a verbal argument when Mr. 
Wanlass initiated contact with Mr. Hoskins by shoving him, and Mr. 
Hoskins shoved Mr. Wanlass back. Id. at 52. 
On rebuttal, the City called Detective Cordan Parks, who testified that 
he interviewed Mr. Hoskins after the incident at issue. IdL at 63-66. Parks 
testified that Mr. Hoskins "told me he was struck in the face first and then he 
said that he elbowed somebody into a car and that was basically all he had to 
say about the incident." Id. at 64. 
The case then went to the jury, who returned with a verdict of "guilty" 
of Assault, a Class B Misdemeanor, a lesser-included offense to that charged 
in the Information. (R. 4, 93.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has ruled that where Rule 609 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence mandates the admission of evidence of prior convictions 
involving dishonesty, it supercedes the balancing provision of Rule 403. 
Here, the trial court denied the admission of evidence of prior 
convictions involving dishonestly based on its misapplication of Rule 403. 
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Because the trial court lacked the discretion to exclude evidence of the 
alleged victim's prior convictions involving dishonesty, such exclusion 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Furthermore, because the credibility of Mr. Hoskins and the alleged 
victim goes to the central issue of the case, the exclusion of evidence of the 
alleged victim's prior convictions involving dishonesty constitutes reversible 
error and entitles Mr. Hoskins to a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO DISCRETION TO 
EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S PRIOR CRIMES 
INVOLVING DISHONESTY OR FALSE STATEMENT, THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING SUCH EVIDENCE. 
This case involves an altercation between two individuals, Mr. Lee 
Wanlass and Defendant Hoskins. Mr. Hoskins' defense is that Mr. Wanlass 
was the aggressor. Both Mr. Wanlass and Mr. Hoskins testified at trial. 
Accordingly, each party's credibility is an important factor for the trier of 
fact to determine which party was the aggressor. 
To impeach the credibility of Mr. Wanlass, Mr. Hoskins sought to 
introduce evidence of Mr. Wanlass's prior convictions for crimes involving 
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dishonesty. During the pre-trial hearing on Hoskins' motions in limine to 
introduce evidence of Mr. Wanlass's prior convictions for, among other 
things, four Third Degree Felony burglaries, one Class A Misdemeanor 
joyriding, and one Third Degree Felony joyriding, counsel for Hoskins 
suggested examining Mr. Wanlass on voir dire. 
In response, counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee Salt Lake City ("the City") 
argued that evidence of Mr. Wanlass's prior convictions were subject to 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
MR. FISHER: And, Judge, even the felonies are subject to Rule 403, 
and I do think that it's important, if we're going down the road, that 
we do some I guess inquiry of him out of the presence of the jury so 
we can see if in fact they do involve dishonesty. 
Tr. 164, p. 6. 
Following the voir dire examination of Mr. Wanlass, the trial court 
ruled as follows: 
THE COURT: I think the burglaries, you know, I guess the tough 
part, is that an act of dishonesty? Yes, it is. Is it going to be prejudicial 
to him? I think the fact that he's coming out in chains and a — I think 
I'm not going to allow any of that. I'll let you ask him about the 
joyride, the details about that. 
I think otherwise there's enough prejudice when he walks out in 
a jumpsuit with handcuffs on that I don't want to take it any further 
than that. 
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THE COURT: ... I've got to weigh the prejudice here, and, you 
know, I think the prejudice is high when he walks out with handcuffs 
on in a jumpsuit, and I don't want to exacerbate that any more than 
necessary, although I will allow you to get into the '01 case where he 
knew that it was a stolen vehicle. 
Tr. 164, p. 24-25. 
The admission or exclusion of evidence is a question of law, and this 
Court should review the trial court's decision to exclude specific evidence 
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cruz-Meza, 76 P.3d 1165 (Utah 2003) 
(citing Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 977 P.2d 474 (Utah 1999). 
Furthermore, Rule 609(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence severely limits 
the trial court's discretion. State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 529, 531 (Utah App. 
1989). 
The issue in this case is whether the trial court possessed the 
discretion to exclude evidence of the alleged victim's prior crimes involving 
dishonesty or false statement because of possible prejudice to that witness. 
In Ross, the Utah Court of Appeals said: 
Like Rule 609, Rule 403 follows the federal rule verbatim, so we look 
to federal case law to resolve defendant's contention. The federal 
courts that have ruled on Rules 609 and 403 in tandem have held that 
the trial court has no discretion to exclude prior crimes involving 
dishonesty or false statement. 782 P.2d at 531. 
In United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1981), the First 
Circuit stated, "We are driven by the force of explicit statutory 
language and legislative history to hold that evidence offered under 
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Rule 609(a)(2) is not subject to the general balancing provision of 
Rule 403." Id at 354. The Kiendra court pointed out that Rule 403 is 
permissive, while Rule 609 is mandatory: "Rule 403 provides, 
'Although relevant, evidence be excluded'... Rule 609(a) provides, 
'evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted.'" 
Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, we hold that where Rule 609 is 
applicable, its mandatory language supercedes the permissive 
language of Rule 403. Id. 
Kiendra also looked to the legislative history surrounding the 
congressional enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and found 
that "when it drafted section 609, Congress had before it a Revised 
Draft that explicitly preserved a trial Judge's discretion to exclude 
crimen falsi impeachment under the standard Rule 403." Kiendra, 663 
F.2d at 355. However, "Congress rejected that option, chose 
mandatory statutory language, and accepted an unambiguous 
Conference Committee Report." Id That report stated: "The 
admission of prior convictions involving dishonesty and false 
statement is not within the discretion of the Court Such convictions 
are peculiarly probative of credibility and, under this rule, are always 
to be admitted:' Id. (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1579, 93rd 
Cong. 2d Sess. 9 (1974)). Id, n.l (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, Hoskins sought to introduce evidence of Mr. 
Wanlass's prior crimes involving dishonesty or false statement to impeach 
the credibility of that witness pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2). 
Despite its acknowledgement that Mr. Wanlass's prior convictions for 
burglary evidenced acts of dishonesty, the trial court excluded such evidence 
citing the potential for prejudice to Mr. Wanlass. Hearing Tr. 164, p. 24,11. 
20-25. 
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But as the Ross court held, the permissive language of Rule 403 -
which addresses concerns of prejudice to the witness - is trumped by Rule 
609's mandatory language. More importantly, once a finding has been made 
that the conviction involves dishonesty or false statement, the admission of 
such convictions are no longer within the trial court's discretion. 
Accordingly, because the trial court abused its discretion by excluding 
evidence of Mr. Wanlass's convictions for crimes involving dishonesty, this 
Court should reverse Hoskins' conviction and remand this case for a new 
trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ADMIT IMPEACHMENT 
EVIDENCE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR BECAUSE SUCH EVIDENCE 
GOES TO THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF THE CASE 
After Mr. Wanlass testified during pre-trial voir dire about the 
burglaries he pled guilty to, the trial court found that the convictions were 
for crimes involving dishonesty. Nonetheless, the trial court excluded the 
strongest evidence that would be relevant to Mr. Wanlass's credibility - his 
four felony convictions for burglary. Tr. 164, p. 24. 
In State v. Wilson, the Utah Court of Appeals articulated the standard 
for reversible error by stating that "reversal is required where there is a 
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reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, defendant would have received a 
more favorable verdict. 771 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also 
State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135,1140 (Utah 1989). 
Here, despite the trial court's finding that Mr. Wanlass's four felony 
convictions for felony burglary were crimes involving dishonesty, the sole 
evidence of Mr. Wanlass's convictions for crimes involving dishonesty 
allowed by the trial court was that of his felony joyriding conviction. Tr. 
164, p. 24; Tr. 149, p. 22. 
During trial, Mr. Wanlass offered the following testimony to support 
the City's position that Hoskins assaulted him: 
Q After Mr. Hoskins raises a fist, what did he do? 
A I stepped up between them and said, "Look, we don't want any 
trouble", you know, and then I got hit and I couldn't tell you 
anything that happened after that. Tr. 149, p. 6. 
Q .. .You said you got hit. Who hit you? 
A Mr. Hoskins hit me. Id, 
Q And you're sure it was Mr. Hoskins that hit you? 
A Yes, sir. Id. at 7. 
In his defense, and in conflict with the testimony of Mr. Wanlass, 
Hoskins testified as follows: 
A ...At that point in time he shoved me. We got into a shoving 
argument. When people say that they heard the bump on the car, his 
mouth hit the car and so did my head hit the car. Tr. 149, R. 52. 
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Q Mr. Hoskins, how did that start? He pushed you first, is that what 
you're saying? 
A Yes sir, very much so, very much so. 
Q Did you hit him? 
A No, I did not hit him. 
Q Did you kick him? 
A I may have kicked him getting from underneath the car. I was on the 
bottom and his head was on top of me and I was underneath the car. 
IcL at 54. 
Q Did you threaten anybody? 
A No, sir. 
Q Try and say to people who were looking on don't testify or else? 
A No, sir, I did business there. No, sir. IcL 
Q Did you intentionally try and hurt Mr. Wanless? 
A No, sir. 
Q Did you intentionally try and break his teeth? 
A No, sir. Id.at 54-55. 
Q So you grabbed each other? 
A No, he grabbed me first. He made the first initial lunge at me first. Id. 
at 58. 
Q ... [D] id he shove you or grab you first? 
A No, he grabbed me. He tried to grab me. ... [A]nd when he tried to do 
that we fell off those steps there. Id.at 59. 
Q So he grabbed you; you pushed back? 
A Actually I would say when he grabbed me I kind of stood my ground 
and when I stood my ground I slipped off of the steps, yes sir. Id.at 
60. 
Admittedly, Mr. Wanlass's version of events was supported by 
another witness, Jesse Lee Garcia II. Tr. 149, R. 32-44. 
However, Mr. Garcia's testimony may not have been enough to 
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support the verdict because the jury may have completely discounted Mr. 
Wanlass's testimony had they heard the excluded impeachment evidence. 
"Impeachment evidence, when disclosed and used effectively, may 
make the difference between conviction and acquittal." State v. Martin, 984 
P.2d 975, 978 (Utah 1999). Considering all of the circumstances in this case 
and the evidence against Mr. Hoskins, and because the impeachment 
evidence excluded by the trial court goes to the central issue of the case — 
whom between Mr. Hoskins and Mr. Wanlass to believe as to which party 
was the aggressor in their altercation - there is a reasonable likelihood there 
would have been a more favorable result for Mr. Hoskins absent the trial 
court's error. 
Accordingly, the refusal of the trial court to allow Mr. Hoskins the 
opportunity to present such evidence to the jury was reversible error. Id. at 
979 (holding trial court's refusal to admit impeachment evidence was not 
harmless error). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hoskins is entitled to a new trial. The trial court erroneously 
excluded specific impeachment evidence of the alleged victim's prior 
convictions for crimes involving dishonesty. Under Utah Rule of Evidence 
14 
609(a)(2), excluding such evidence was not within the trial court's 
discretion. In addition, because such evidence goes to the central issue in the 
case, its exclusion constituted reversible error. 
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1 these - they really don't fit. 
2 MR. McCULLOUGH: Well, it said - the rule does say 
3 anything — anything that's a felony or above I can — I can — 
4 THE COURT: Right. You can bring it in, right. The 
5 ^86 case, it's out. 
6 MR. McCULLOUGH: Right. I took that out of my notes 
7 last night. I realized that was too far. 
8 THE COURT: The theft cases, I think, depending on 
9 the facts of the cases, certainly could be acts of dishonesty 
10 in the sense that maybe he's lying to someone about something, 
11 or something. 
12 MR. McCULLOUGH: We may want to voir dire him quick — 
13 briefly out the hearing of the jury if we get to that point, 
14 but any felonies are enough, honestly. 
15 MR. FISHER: And, Judge, even the felonies are 
16 subject to Rule 403, and I do think it's important, if we're 
17 going to go down the road, that we do some I guess inquiry of 
18 him out of the presence of the jury so we can see if in fact 
19 they do involve dishonesty. ^Cause I know, for example, retail 
20 I thefts, those are generally not considered the type of offense 
21 that -
22 THE COURT: Well, I don't know that I'd let the 
23 misdemeanors in, even though they may have been previously 
24 charged as a felony. And then I think what I'm going to do is 
25 I'll take under advisement your third motion, and we can talk 
Q And that, once again, has not been — you have not 
been convicted of any of that? 
A No. 
THE COURT: Anything, Mr. Fisher? 
MR. FISHER: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. You can take Mr. Garcia back. 
I'm not going to let you get into anything with him. 
Now let's address the other gentleman. The A86 case 
obviously I'm not going to allow. The only one that I can 
really pinpoint as something that would involve dishonesty 
would be the joyride of A02 — or A01, I guess it was, where he 
said he knew that the vehicle was stolen, and he kept it 
anyway. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: You wouldn't count the burglaries, 
your Honor? 
THE COURT: Well, I was getting to those. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Okay. 
THE COURT: I was just addressing now — 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Oh, all right. 
THE COURT: I think the burglaries, you know, I guess 
the tough part, is that an act of dishonesty? Yes, it is. Is 
it going to be prejudicial to him? I think the fact that he's 
coming out in chains and a — I think I'm not going to allow any 
of that. I'll let you ask him about the joyride, the details 
about that. 
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1 I think otherwise there's enough prejudice when he 
2 walks out in a jumpsuit with handcuffs on that I don't want to 
3 take it any farther than that. 
4 MR. McCULLOUGH: Well, your Honor, the guy is a 
5 career criminal. 
6 THE COURT: Well, yeah, he's probably a drug addict. 
7 MR. McCULLOUGH: Well, and it's the war on drugs 
8 that's responsible for that, not the drugs, but — 
9 THE COURT: True. I understand that. I understand 
10 that. But, you know, I've got to kind of weigh the prejudice 
11 here, and, you know, I think the prejudice is high when he 
12 walks out with handcuffs on in a jumpsuit, and I don't want to 
13 exacerbate that any more than is necessary, although I will 
14 allow you to get into the *01 case where he knew that it was a 
15 stolen vehicle. 
16 MR. McCULLOUGH: And I'm not, then, allowed to asked 
17 him anything about why he's in jail now? 
18 THE COURT: Oh, yeah, I suppose you can do that. 
19 MR. McCULLOUGH: Okay. 
20 THE COURT: Yeah. 
21 MR. McCULLOUGH: Well, okay. Yeah. I mean it's on 
22 two violations. 
23 THE COURT: It's obvious - I guess it's obvious, and 
24 the jury's going to draw some conclusions. I don't know if you 
25 want to let the jury — if you want them to run wild with it, or 
25 
